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FOREWORD-THE LION ROARED ONCE
JAMES B. ZAGEL*
Introduction
The leonine spirit of Sir Edward Coke receded
rapidly into the mist during the last term of the
Supreme Court. Just once did the Justices really
exercise their power to check the will of the sover-
eign states and the central government. The result
merits neither extravagant praise nor condemna-
tion even for those who enjoy responding that way
to the Court's opinions. Moreover, the favored
exercise of predicting the Court's future direction
has been made quite difficult. Perceiving the course
of decisions from the bits and pieces of this term
is like reading ancient runes.
Still another problem burdens any reviewer.
Traditionally, it is not just the opinions of judges
that grow stale or absurd or comic with the passage
of time. It might seem so, but only because we
often read vintage opinions and seldom examine
vintage law reviews. Yet, the readers of old periodi-
cals learn that contemporaneous comment about
judicial opinions has aged somewhat less grace-
fully than the opinions themselves. Only after the
test of time and practice can the wisdom or error
of a significant decision be properly assessed.
Quick judgments of the merits of disputed legal
questions are too intellectually hazardous. While
judges risk the hazard, they are compelled to do so.
Further, they are paid for it. The commentator,
on the other hand, is a heedless volunteer.
Accordingly, neither praise nor condemnation
nor clear prediction of the future is my primary
purpose. I shall try to avoid the hazards just de-
scribed, secure in the expectation that legions of
others will accept the dare, and that the Court
will not suffer a shortage of strident criticism and
* Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Criminal
Justice Division; Office of the Attorney General,
State of Illinois. B A. 1962; M.A. 1962, University of
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way attributable to the Office of the Attorney General,
State of Illinois.
visionary prophecy based on its work. My chief
concern is to analyze the Court's performance,
that is, what the Court did and the quality of its
way of doing it.
Criminal Law
The two most discussed opinions of the 1972
Term concerned substantive provisions of state
criminal law: prohibitions against abortion and
pornography. That substantive provisions of state
criminal law should command such attention is
rather unusual for two reasons. First, in recent
terms the predominant emphasis has been on police
and judicial procedure. Second, the attention paid
to substantive criminal law is not likely to continue
in the future for there are not many enforced
criminal laws that are subject to the same kind of
difficulties encountered in the abortion and pornog-
raphy cases. Moreover, what room there is for
arguing about the substantive criminal law gen-
erally encompasses questions of defense, not issues
of prohibition. The abortion and obscenity deci-
sions, then, stand out for other reasons in addition
to their sagacity, timeliness or importance.
Abortion
In Roe v. Wade,1 the Court held unconstitutional
a typical state law against abortion. Essentially
the Court ruled first that there is a fundamental
right, albeit qualified, to do with one's body as
one pleases, including terminating a pregnancy.
This right is part of the right of privacy, sometimes
called the right to be let alone. Next, having es-
tablished this basic premise, the Court followed a
classical style of analysis: to justify a limitation
on that right the State would have to show a
compelling interest.
Three such interests were analyzed and found
wanting. First, the prevention of illicit sexual con-
duct was deemed irrelevant as a proper State pur-
1410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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pose since the prohibition applied to married
women whose pregnancies resulted from inter-
course with their husbands.
Second, the Court considered the State's interest
in protecting the life and health of the pregnant
woman, and correctly noted that this was the
primary historical purpose of abortion statutes.
The Court held squarely that this interest would be
sufficient to deny abortion. Yet the protection of
the mother's health could not justify the broad
scope of existing statutes.
Statistically there is greater risk to health by
allowing a pregnancy to come to term than there is
by aborting the pregnancy in the first trimester.
The State then had no valid interest in banning
abortion during the first trimester except to limit
its performance to physicians. Since the risk of
harm from abortion increases in the second tri-
mester, the State may regulate the abortion proce-
dure to the extent it is reasonably related to ma-
ternal health.
Third, the State alleged an interest in protecting
the right of the unborn. This contention has two
facets. One is that human life begins at conception.
Hence the State can take appropriate steps to
protect it. The other is that, regardless of state
law, a fetus is a person who cannot be deprived of
life without due process of law as required by the
fourteenth amendment.
The Court rejected the fourteenth amendment
argument on essentially technical grounds. The
fetus could not be considered a person within the
meaning of that amendment without doing violence
to precedent and the relevant historic milieu in
which the amendment was formulated.
The State's interest in preserving human life was
recognized as appropriate, but a state could not
reasonably decide that human life begins at con-
ception. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that
many hold the view that human life begins at
conception, but noted that there is no scientific
consensus on this issue. When neither medicine nor
ethics can arrive at a consensus there is no com-
pelling state interest in the adoption of one of a
number of competing theories. However, the Court
recognized that as to the third trimester and some
weeks prior thereto, there was a consensus as to
viability. When viability of the fetus exists
the State, in promoting its interest in the poten-
tiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
2
In Doe v. Boltkn,a the Court overturned an abor-
tion statute based upon the Model Penal Code.
Doe is particularly important because it severely
limits the degree of indirect control that the state
may exercise over abortion through the enactment
of rigorous medical requirements. The Court found
invalid Georgia provisions requiring (a) abortions
to be performed in accredited hospitals; (b)
abortions to be performed in hospitals in so far
as that requirement applied to first trimester
abortions; (c) prior approval by a hospital abortion
committee; (d) the concurrence of two physicians
and (e) a limitation of abortions to residents of
Georgia.
The abortion decisions are fairly comprehensive.
Yet, there are some unresolved issues, and the
decisions will create new issues. For example, it
seems clear that though the decisions create a
barrier to state interference, they do not create a
federally enforceable right to abortion. 4 Hence, a
physician may refuse to perform an abortion if it is
against the dictates of his conscience. Moreover,
some unanswered questions will be extraordinarily
difficult. Whether the right of the father to have
his child5 can impinge upon the mother's right to
abortion is one such problem, though it may arise
relatively infrequently. Also, the question of
government or private insurance coverage for
abortion will arise but should be resolved it some
place other than the constitutional arena.
The opinions in Roe and Doe are persuasive al-
though the approach is reminiscent of the opinions
of an earlier day invalidating the regnlation of
business on substantive due process grounds.
6
Justice Blackmun has written a strong justification
for the decision. Indeed, one is inclined to believe
that the analysis compelled the result. There is no
sense of post-hoc rationale jerry-built to support a
reactive policy decision. But even those who agree
with the decision must be troubled by some of its
logic. The heavy reliance upon existing medical
knowledge and practice is disturbing. If develop-
ments in medical practice some day render it safer
to carry a pregnancy to term than to have an
2 Id. at 164.
3410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4 Id. at 210 (Douglas, J., concurring).
5 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).6 E.g., New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
(1932); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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abortion in the first trimester, do the decisions
cease to have force? If medicine can preserve the
viability of a fetus at earlier and earlier points in
the pregnancy term, can the state expand its abor-
tion prohibition to coincide with that date?
Decisions often are based on premises subject to
change, but there is a particular risk in resting
opinions upon a narrow statistical base. An example
of this is Witherspoon v. Illinois.7 In this case the
Court decided against excluding from capital cases
jurors who were merely opposed to the death
penalty. The opinion relied upon polls showing that
the number of persons favoring the death penalty
had fallen to below fifty percent. Later polls showed
an increase in support for the death penalty and a
decrease in opposition to it. While there are other
grounds to support the Witherspoon rule which in
practice seemed to benefit or, at least, not harm
the prosecution's position in jury selection, the
change in the polls has eroded an important basis
of the decision. As with Witherspoon, the abortion
decisions may not ever be reconsidered even if the
statistical and scientific bases upon which they rest
are changed. The practical barriers to reenactment
of unconstitutional statutes on the basis of changed
conditions are enormous.
When the Court rules as it did in the abortion
cases, it cannot be expected to forego reliance on
scientific materials, but it should make clear the
precise degree of its reliance on statistical data and
medical consensus. The Court also should clarify
the extent to which its holding must be modified if
the scientific premises on which it relies are modi-
fied or disproven. Otherwise the Court may erect a
permanent barrier where its rationale (and perhaps
its intent) supports only a temporary structure.
Lastly, it is interesting to speculate on the effect
the population explosion and other social condi-
tions had upon the abortion decision. Did the rela-
tively poor job society does with its unwanted
children affect the Court? The Court did not deal
with, nor did anyone offer, the argument that the
State had a compelling interest in preventing
abortion because it was underpopulated, had no
7391 U.S. 510 (1968).
8 A state might enact an open-ended statute leaving
unspecified the point in time the fetus becomes viable
and the point in time that continuing pregnancy be-
comes safer than abortion. The state could provide
for a commission of experts to determine on a periodic
basis the proper dates in light of the latest scientific
consensus and to issue an appropriate regulation having
the force of law.
unemployment and needed manpower. If Australia
or Siberia or Israel were in the union, could they
sustain the enactment of an anti-abortion law?
Could the United States or any of the states suc-
cessfully enact an abortion law if we still had a
frontier? If, for any reason, this nation someday
requires a large increase in its population, will Roe
and Doe still be good law?
The Pornography Cases
In Miller v. California,9 a majority of the Court
adopted a basic standard applicable to state and
federal'0 prosecutions of obscenity cases:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying con-
temporary community standard," would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest..., (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state
law and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. We do not adopt as a constitutional stand-
ard the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test....
The Court reiterated the theme that obscenity
was not protected by the first amendment and, in a
series of cases accompanying Miller, settled many
of the current controversies arising in the enforce-
ment of obscenity laws. The decisions rejected
contentions that community standards must be
national in scope,2 that a book without pictures
cannot be obscene13 and that the prosecution must
produce expert testimony on the question of ob-
scenity. However, the Court reserved judgment as
to the necessity of expert testimony when the
material is aimed at "such a bizarre deviant group"
that its prurient appeal is incomprehensible to the
ordinary trier of fact. 4 Also, the Court adhered to
the principle established earlier in United States v.
ReideP5 and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
9 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
10 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 mm
Film, 93 S. Ct. 2605 (1973).
n193 S. Ct. at 2615. (emphasis in original).
22 Id. at 2619. The Court may have left open the
question of whether the standard must be statewide.
The case before the Court involved a statewide stand-
ard and that standard was approved. Whether a local
standard is proper is anybody's guess.
"Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973).
14 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628
(1973).
i5 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
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graphs", in upholding a ban on import 17 and com-
mon carrier transportation 8 of obscene material
intended solely for the private use of the importer
or passenger.
The Court reached three procedural issues per-
taining to the enforcement of obscenity laws. In
Heller v. New York, 9 the Court upheld a warrant
seizure of a single copy of a film for use at trial.
The warrant was issued without an adversary
hearing but after the issuing judge had seen the film.
The procedure was enhanced both by the exhibi-
tor's right to an immediate hearing after seizure
and by his right to obtain a copy of the film seized
if he has no other copy available. In Roaden v.
Kentucky,20 the officer who seized the film had seen
it, but a magistrate had not. Thus, the seizure of the
film without a warrant was held illegal. In Alexan-
der v. Virginia,21 the Court held that there is no
right to a jury trial in a civil obscenity forfeiture
proceeding.
Very early in the term the Court approved a
California regulation prohibiting nude performers,
simulated or real sexual acts and comparable con-
duct on premises licensed to serve alcoholic bever-
ages by the drink.2 The regulations, which ad-
mittedly applied to some cases where the per-
formance was within the limits of constitutional
protection were upheld primarily upon the power
of the States to regulate the time, place and condi-
tions of the sale of liquor.
These pornography cases were the subject of an
incredible degree of public comment. The general
theme was that the Court had made the prosecu-
tion of pornography a far easier matter and had
extended the reach of the obscenity concept. I
doubt that this initial view has any validity. In
sum, the Court made no major change in the exist-
ing obscenity law that improves the position of the
prosecutor. The test applied by the Court is es-
sentially that offered in 1957.22 The rejection of
"utterly without redeeming social value" in favor
of "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value" is interesting but insignificant. In
recent years the materials subjected to prosecution
have not been capable of supporting a contention of
redeeming value. More importantly both court and
16 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
11 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 93 S. Ct. 2665
(1973).
"United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973).
9 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973).
20 93 S. Ct. 2796 (1973).
2193 S. Ct. 2803 (1973).
"California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
jury will, in my experience, construe the Y'utterly
without" language to mean the same thing as
lacking "serious ... value." Indeed the conviction
reviewed in Miller, was obtained under a statute
embodying the "utterly without" standard. The
rejection of the national standard of the require-
ment of expert testimony and of the per se non-
obscenity of printed words is surely no departure
from the clear majority rule existing prior to June
21, 1973.
What is most "newsworthy" is that the Court
fell one vote short of outlawing all obscenity prose-
cutions. The two votes of the immediate past
(Douglas and Black) are now four (Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart and Marshall). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, offers the
view that the concept of obscenity is simply too
vague to permit it to be the basis for criminal
sanctions. This vagueness has imposed three unac-
ceptable burdens: the absence of fair notice of
what is prohibited, the chilling of protected expres-
sion and the stress upon judicial machinery. caused
by the attempt to apply a standard that is per-
petually uncertain. The heart of this dissent is the
conviction that it is beyond the power of man to
clarify or delineate the notion of obscenity. Justice
Brennan did not reach the contention that ob-
scenity was protected by the first amendment or
by a ninth amendment right of privacy,,because he
assumed arguendo that no such barriers.existed.
His opinion was grounded not on abstractprinci-
ples but upon some lessons of experience. -
The force of Justice Brennan's dissent should not
be underestimated. Its arguments had a clear im-
pact on the opinion of the Court as is evident in the
following passages from the Chief Justice's opinion:
We acknowledge ... the inherent dangers of
undertaking to regulate any form of expression.
State statutes designed to regulate obscene ma-
terials must be carefully limited .... As a result
we now confine the permissible scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual
conduct. That conduct must be specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law as written or
authoritatively construed....
It is possible to give a few plain examples of
what a state statute could define for regula-
tion... :
(a) Patently offensive representations or descrip-
tions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive repre-
sentations or descriptions of masturbation, excre-
tory functions, and lewd exhibition of the g6nitals.
14
2193 S. Ct. at 2615.
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In adopting this view, it may be argued, with
considerable force, that the Court now will require
state law to embody the kind of obscenity prohibi-
tion proposed in Richard Kuh's Foolish Figleaves.
25
That sort of law specifies in exquisite detail pre-
cisely what cannot be depicted. Someone (I think
William Buckley) said that Kuh's law would be
an obscenity statute that is itself obscene. If the
Court intends to require such state law, then the
real significance of the obscenity decisions is that
they leave most existing obscenity statutes un-
enforceable until amended or construed into com-
pliance with Miller. And when this process is com-
pleted the scope of pornography prosecutions may
well be narrowed. At the very minimum, the Court
excluded from the reach of obscenity laws the
depiction or exhibition of excessive violence though
the reasoning of the opinion would seem to permit
a State to enact some form of law restricting vio-
lence in media.
Apart from these questions of scope and effect
considered in Miller, the other pornography opin-
ions, particularly Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 26
are characterized by a willingness to confront the
dissents' premises: that (a) the first amendment
bars regulation of speech and association (which
occurs when consenting adults attend a film),n
(b) the only regulation of offensive material should
be that of the marketplaceu and (c) there is a right
to receive information and ideas regardless of their
social worth (closely tied to the right to be free
from unjustified governmental intrusions into one's
privacy) and consequently the state cannot punish
one who provides this information to a willing
adult recipient. To these premises, the parties
added a claim that there was no scientific data to
prove that obscenity adversely affects humans or
their society.
The majority offered articulate rebuttal. First,
lawmakers have always relied on unprovable as-
sumptions that certain practices are harmful. Thus
the antitrust laws restrict association, and securi-
ties and consumer protection laws restrict public
expression, though the harm from the forbidden
practices may not be demonstrable. Anti-pollution
legislation and aesthetic zoning requirements are
similarly based on questionable assumptions.
2 R. KuH, FoorsH FIaI.EAvEs? PORN OGRAPHY Iw
AND OUT op COURT (1967).
2893 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
SMiller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
21 Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Second, the Court reasoned that if we are willing,
as we have shown ourselves to be, to accept un-
provable theses that a complete education requires
certain books and that good books and art improve
the condition of man, it is proper to allow the states
to enact statutes on the assumption that obscene
materials and exhibitions will corrupt and debase
the condition of man.29 Third, as to regulation by
the exercise of individual free choice, the Court
recognized the power of the states to choose this
course, yet noted they are not compelled to do so.
The unlimited exercise of freewill is not found in
any society. And the power of states to regulate on
the assumption that it will serve the general wel-
fare is undoubted. The Chief Justice observed that,
"States are told by some that they must await a
'laissez-faire' market solution to the obscenity-
pornography problem, paradoxically 'by people
who never otherwise had a kind word to say for
"laissez-faire" particularly in solving urban com-
mercial and environmental pollution problems.' "0
Finally, the Court rejected the application of the
privacy doctrine to the regulation of events at
places of public accommodation such as stores and
theaters. The denial of access to materials without
serious social value could not be deemed an at-
tempt to control thought. Further, the fact that
government regulation may affect the nature of a
citizen's mental life does not invalidate the regula-
tion, just as prohibition of narcotics is not improper
because it denies individuals access to drug induced
fantasies and perceptions.
Anyone reading the pornography opinions may
be tempted to criticize the arguments offered by
both sides. But the arguments are quite subtle and
appear irresolvable. In the end, one must simply
judge for himself whether the social engineering
analogy does apply to the control of pornography.
There is an unexplored but undeniable tension
between the majority view in the abortion cases
and that in the pornography cases. In Roe, the
Court would not let the States enact laws on cer-
tain assumptions because there was no scientific
consensus. But is the assumption that abortion
destroys human life any less supportable than the
assumption that pornography debases society?
2 The sum of experience, including that of the past
two decades, affords an ample basis for legislatures to
conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human
existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality, can be
debased and distorted by gross commercial exploita-
tion of sex. 93 S. Ct. at 2638.30Id. at 2639.
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Could a State argue that abortion may be pro-
hibited because widespread, legal abortion can
debase and distort "a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community
welfare and the development of human personal-
ity?" 1 Do not the abortion laws have the same
indirect effect on the life of the individual as do
narcotics and pronography laws since the law in
most cases does not punish the mother but only the
one who seeks to supply the forbidden service?
The difficulty in squaring the reasoning, if not the
results, in the two cases was not even mentioned
by the Justices. Perhaps the dissenters in Miller,
all of whom joined in Roe, did not wish to say
anything to diminish the authority of Roe. Two of
the majority in Miller dissented in Roe and had no
need to justify adoption of a new tack. The Chief
Justice, who wrote Miller, had at least indicated
in a concurrence his discomfort at the manner the
Court supported its ruling in Roe. In any event,
the abortion and pornography cases constitute an
odd couple, but I doubt that they can exist to-
gether forever. The judicial odd couple, like the
television series, will last for several terms, with
endless reruns in lower federal courts before the
synthesis (or cancellation) is achieved.
Entrapment
The other major criminal law decision was
United States v. Russell, in which the Court ad-
hered to the traditional view that entrapment is
a limited defense. In this view entrapment is,
rather than a prophylactic rule for overzealous
law enforcement, a theory simply allowing the
defendant to contend that he lacked the requisite
intent to commit the crime because he was induced
to its commission by government agents. Accord-
ingly, the government may offer, and the jury may
consider, evidence of the predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime. While the Court
recognized that law enforcement conduct may be so
"shocking" that due process requires dismissal of
the charge, it noted that such claims are not dealt
with in terms of entrapment and are not limited to
cases of entrapment. In Russell the Court found
that reasonable drug law enforcement requires
infiltration into drug rings and that limited par-
ticipation in unlawful activities of the ring is neces-
sary and proper. The dissent, however, urged the
use of entrapment rules to regulate police conduct
and argued that the existence of entrapment should
3' Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
be judged solely in light of police conduct without
regard to the defendant's predisposition.
The distinction between the two approaches has
some significant practical consequences. The
"police conduct" approach presumably would
result in a judicial determination of the propriety
of the police conduct. Perhaps the Accused would
have a right to a pre-trial determination of entrap-
ment and could use the hearing for discovery pur-
poses. The approach adopted by the majority
leaves that determination in the hands of the trier
of fact as is the case with any other defense. Of
course, a defense of entrapment, like that of self-
defense, entails at least the implicit admission of
some of the elements of the offense.
In concluding this section on criminal law, I
reiterate that the major work of the Supreme Court
in the substantive criminal law will, in future
instances, be found in cases like Russell rather than
in cases like Roe.n The novel and pressing questions
of criminal law today are rooted in the scope of
defenses, particularly in the nature of compulsion
(by conscience or by drug addiction or other needs),
diminished responsibility and justification result-
ing from the allegedly illegal acts of the victim or
the prosecuting government.
Both sides in Russell advanced forceful argu-
ments to support their views but the sum of Russell
is that the Court left the law as it found it. The
Court specifically left entrapment as a defense,
refusing to make the doctrine comparable- to an
exclusionary rule. What the Court did do with its
various piecemeal exclusionary rules is our next
concern.
The Exclusionary Rules
The Court opened its annual wrestling match
with the fourth amendment in a relatively unique
context. In United States v. Dionisio4 and in a
3 The Court will continue, of course, to decide
routine questions of substantive criminal law involving
the construction of federal statutes. There were four
such cases this term. United States v. Enmons 93 S.
Ct. 1007 (1973) (Use of violence to obtain higher wages
is not a violation of the Hobbs Act); Bronston v.
United States 93 S. Ct. 595 (1973) (An answer which
is literally true but not responsive and misleading by
negative implication cannot be punished as perjury.);
Erlenbaugh v. United States 93 S. Ct. 477 (1972)
(Statute proscribing the use of interstate facilities to
carry on unlawful gambling is applicable to one who
used an interstate train to transport a newspaper
scratch sheet.); United States v. Bishop 93 S. Ct. 2008
(1973) (Where the only issue at trial concerned wil-
fulness, the accused is not entitled to a lesser-included
offense instruction because the element of wilfuness
is the same in both the greater and lesser offense).
34 410 U.S. 1 (1972).
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companion case," the Court encountered and
rejected a claim that voice and handwriting ex-
emplars, unprotected by any fifth amendment
privilege, cannot be subpoenaed by a grand jury
without a preliminary showing of reasonableness.
The Court noted the absence of valid fifth amend-
ment claims and observed that obtaining an ex-
emplar is not a serious infringement of the person.
In comparison to a frisk, the intrusion is minimal,
particularly where the subpoena is used, and the
subject receives advance notice, may obtain legal
assistance and is not in custody. Balanced against
this minimal incursion are the needs of the grand
jury.
The Court gave great weight to the role of the
grand jury, noting that the fifth amendment
mandates the use of the grand jury and presupposes
an investigative body acting independently of
judge and prosecutor. It stated,
Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with
mini-trials and preliminary showings would as-
suredly impede its investigation and frustrate the
public's interest in the fair and expeditious ad-
ministration of the criminal laws .... The grand
jury may not always serve its historic role as a
protective bulwark ... but if it is even to approach
the proper performance of its constitutional mis-
sion, it must be free to pursue its investigations
unhindered by external influence or supervision so
long as it does not trench upon the legitimate
rights of any witness called before it 3
6
While the Court did not foreclose a challenge to
a subpoena in which the witness made an affirma-
tive showing of unreasonableness, the Court did
uphold subpoenas to twenty persons in Dionisio for
voice comparison with recorded conversations.
Thus it is fairly clear that a witness would have to
make an extraordinary showing of abuse to gain
even a hearing on his claim.
Justice Brennan dissented on fourth amendment
grounds. justice Marshall dissented on fourth and
fifth amendment theories. justice Douglas agreed
with the Seventh Circuit opinion below and argued
that the grand jury is the tool of the prosecutor.
Parenthetically, it is difficult to see how Justice
Douglas can regard the grand jury as a tool of the
prosecution and also have joined in an opinion, the
basic premise of which is that improper grand jury
selection is prejudicial error.
31 United States y. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1972).
36 410 U.S. at 17.
17 Tollett v. Henderson 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davis
v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
Dionisio is another instance in which the Court
refused to change the law, or to be precise, reversed
a lower federal court which did change the law. No
significant body of law has ever required the show-
ing of reasonableness for the issuance of a sub-
poena.P' Claims of privilege could defeat the sub-
poena, but no privilege existed in Dionmiio. When
the Court held in 1967 that voice and handwriting
examplars were without the protection of the fifth
amendment, 9 the result in Dionisio became in-
evitable unless the Court wished to adopt new
rules of law.
This does not mean that Dionisio is a wise decl-
sion. Its ultimate value will be judged in terms of
the good or evil that comes from grand jury in-
vestigation. If the books were to be closed today,
I would be more than inclined to praise the deci-
sion. On rare occasions a grand jury may be used to
harass political dissidents, but even if there were
no grand jury, a prosecutor acting in bad faith
could still find means to harass. The far more com-
mon, non-routine function of the grand jury has
been the uncovering of political corruption, or-
ganized crime and high financial chicanery-often
against the desires, and in spite of the interference,
of local judges. If the grand jury were fettered, the
prosecutor would have no other effective investiga-
tive resource excepting the personal administrative
subpoena power which is subject to the same objec-
tions leveled against grand jury subpoenas. 40
Search and Seizure
The remainder of the Court's fourth amendment
ventures surfaced chiefly toward the end of the
term. In April, the Court reiterated in Brown v.
33 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632 (1950).
31 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
40 In another subpoena case, Couch v. United States,
93 S. Ct. 611 (1973), the Court ruled that a taxpayer
cannot assert a fifth amendment claim to defeat a
subpoena of her records when the records were in her
accountant's possession and the subpoena was directed
to him. The Court held that "actual possession of
documents bears the most significant relationship to
Fifth Amendment protection.. ...." The Court con-
ceded that there may be situations where the con-
structive possession is so clear (e.g., where the ac-
countant is the full time employee of taxpayer and
occupying space in the taxpayer's office) or the re-
linquishment of possession so temporary and insig-
nificant that the subpoena is, in effect, directed to the
taxpayer himself. The Court held that there was no
federal accountant-client privilege, that the state
created privileges are not to be recognized in federal
cases and that there was no justification for such a
privilege in federal criminal tax cases.
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United States," the viability of the standing require-
ment and held that an accused has no standing to
challenge the illegal seizure of evidence, i.e., stolen
goods, from a conspirator's premises. The unani-
mous ruling was based on the fact that the accused
was not on the premises when the search occurred,
had no proprietory or possessory interests in the
premises and was not charged with an offense
which included as an essential element, possession
of the goods at the time they were seized. The
decisiop is neither unexpected nor especially signifi-
cant.
In May, the Court held in Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte,0 that a police officer need not warn a citizen
of his right to refuse to consent to a search as a
prerequisite for securing a valid consent, at least in
cases where the consenting individual is not in
custody. To the extent that the decision applies to
persons not in custody, it is consistent with the
majority of decided cases and with the basic prin-
ciples of Miranda v. Arizona.4" The holding is
narrow and continues the traditional test of volun-
tariness in" consent search cases.
Another narrow holding is Cupp v. Murphy,44
which approved the warrantless scraping of evi-
dence from. a suspect's fingernails when the police
had probable cause to arrest. The scraping was
upheld although it preceded formal arrest. Only
Justice Douglas disagreed with the basic principle
espoused by the majority. He agreed that exigent
circumstances justified detention but argued that
a warrant should have been obtained prior to the
scraping. The Court did not consider the question
of seizure of physical evidence, like the scrapings,
upon a showing of reasonableness somewhat short
of probable cause though the question was raised.
In late June, the final two fourth amendment
cases were decided. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,'5 a plurality of the Court ruled unconstitu-
tional a federal regulation promulgated under the
authority of an Act of Congress, allowing adminis-
trative searches, without probable cause, for aliens
in automobiles and conveyances within 100 miles of
any border. The plurality cast no doubt on the right
to conduct border searches without probable cause
- 411 U.S. 223 (1973). The Court reserved the ques-
tion of whether the automatic standing rule of Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) has any con-
tinuing validity since the decision in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), removed the
danger of coerced self-incrimination.
4m 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
"3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"4 412 U.S. 292 (1973).
45 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973).
or to engage in their functional equivalents, but was
unwilling to extend the rule to these alien searches
and rejected the Congressional attempt to do so.
The four dissenters argued that a roving check of
vehicles to uncover illegal aliens is reasonable as a
general practice and was reasonable in this particu-
lar case. The swing vote was cast by Justice Powell
who agreed with the basic premises of the plurality
but added his view that the procedure would be
proper if authorized by an area search warrant
issued upon less than probable cause. All four
dissenters agreed that such warrants would be
proper. The net effect is the authorization of
another restricted class of searches that may be
conducted without a showing of traditional prob-
able cause.
In Cady v. Dombrowski,46 the Court approved by
a vote of five to four the warrantless search of the
trunk of an automobile in police custody when the
police had reason to believe the trunk contained
a revolver and the trunk was vulnerable to intru-
sion by vandals. The decision has little value as
precedent but may serve as the foundation for the
future articulation of a doctrine approving inven-
tory searches carried out pursuant to a standard
operating procedure.
These decisions concerning police searches and
seizures are commendably clear in large part and,
with the possible exception of Cady, dealt with
issues of sufficient significance to justify decision
by the highest court. What the Court did niot do,
however, was more interesting than what it did do.
In Schneckloth, three justices argued that claims
of illegal search and seizure ought to be unavailable
in collateral attack on state and federal convictions.
A fourth justice expressed agreement with the
view but thought the question need not be resolved.
The writer of the opinion in Schneckloth, Justice
Stewart, dissented in Kaufman v. United States,07
which was the case establishing dearly the right to
raise fourth amendment claims in post-conviction
actions. Moreover, the Court voted to hear a case
challenging validity of the application at trial
of the exclusionary rule in its present form. After
argument the Court entertained a concern that
there was an adequate basis in state law for the
decision independent of the federal question. The
Court remanded the case without reaching the
issue.0s At least one case this coming term will
46 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973).
394 U.S. 217 (1969).
'sCalifornia v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
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present a direct challenge to the-exclusionary rule, 9
and it is to the 1973 term that one-must look for
revolutions in fourth amendment law.
Identification
The only non-fourth amendment exclusion cases
involved eyewitness identification. In Neil v.
Biggers,50 the Court reversed the decisions of two
lower federal courts that an in-court identification
was inadmissible. Three dissenters took issue, not
with the result, but rather with the fact that the
Court undertook to decide the case at all. The
dissent saw no reason to decide an essentially
factual question that had already been resolved by
the district court and the court of appeals with
both courts reaching the same conclusion.
The decision in Neil must be assessed in light of
the state of the relevant law. The suppression of an
in-court identification, as opposed to the suppres-
sion of evidence of prior out-of-court identifica-
tions, is a relatively infrequent occurrence. One can
find only a handful of reported cases in which
courtroom identifications are excluded. This condi-
tion is not surprising in light of the historical re-
luctance to exclude eyewitness testimony and the
distaste with which most judges view the prospect
of telling a lay (non-police) witness that he has no
right to speak his piece in court. It is, however,
impossible to determine from the basic lineup
cases" whether the Court intended that the courts
be so slow to suppress courtroom identification.
That the Court was willing to give lower courts
great leeway in admitting in-court identification
became apparent in Coleman v. Alabana.5 In Neil,
the Court, by reversing one of the rare reported
suppression decisions, gave clear affirmative notice
that the exclusionary rule is not to be applied to
exclude courtroom identification barring excep-
tional circumstances.
In United States v. Ash,O the Court refused to
extend the right, of counsel to photographic dis-
plays for witness identification. The rejection of the
counsel requirement for photograph confrontations
was unequivocal. Whether or not the accused is in
custody or the confrontation occurs after indict-
41United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1500 (1973); See also
State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972), cert.
granted, 93 S. Ct. 1494 (1973).
'o409 U.S. 188 (1973).
b United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
N 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
s 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973.
ment, the Court held that the right to counsel is
applicable only when the personal presenc6 of the
accused is normally required. Further, it reasoned
that even if counsel might in some cases be required
to safeguard the adversary process despite the
absence of his client, the photograph identification
process is not so inherently risky that, an -extra-
ordinary system of protections is required. justice
Stewart concurred on the ground that the possibil-
ity of irretrievable prejudice is not so great as to
require the presence of counsel. The three dis-
senters argued that the same risks inherent in the
lineup process are present in the photo display and
both are "critical." Further, the dissent contended
that the limitation of counsel to situations involv-
ing the presence of the accused is strained and
unsupportable.
The result in Ash is in accordance with the vast
majority of the earlier lower court decisions.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of both majority and
dissent are subject to valid criticism. The'majority
opinion is vulnerable to the objections-of the dis-
senters. But the dissent assumes premises that are
as difficult to support as those offered by the
majority.
If the limitation of counsel to cases involving the
defendant's presence is artificial, so too is the
limitation which the writer (Justice Brennan) of
the "critical" stage dissent first promulgated in the
lineup trilogy."
In United States v. Wade55 the Court adopted a
theory that the right to counsel arises "where
counsel's absence might derogate from the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial." 56 It can be argued, as
the dissent in Ash does, that Wade requires counsel
whenever his presence would help to amsure the
reliability of the fact finding process. Yet, the
dissenters draw their own artificial line to restrict
the logically inevitable consequences of their basic
premises.
In the lineup cases the Court held that scientific
testing procedures did not require the presence of
counsel. However, an unscrupulous, unwatched
laboratory technician can report phony -results
particularly where the test destroys all of the ma-
terial available for testing and this assuredly
derogates from a fair trial. Indeed, most of the
abuses cited in the lineup cases involved deliberate
misconduct, not honest error.
"United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).




None of the dissenters would require the right to
counsel when the prosecutor interviews the wit-
nesses, 7 when the prosecutor presents evidence to
the grand jury," or when the police present a sus-
pect to a witness for identification shortly after
commission of the crime. 9 Nor would the dis-
senters require the presence of counsel at every step
of the police investigation. Nonetheless, the es-
sential principles upon which the dissent relies
would in fact require these holdings in the absence
of arbitrary limitations.
It is my view that the Court would do better to
re-examine its emphasis upon the use of counsel as
a solution to difficult problems in criminal justice.
It has been persuasively argued that the imposition
of counsel at line-ups does not serve in practice the
purpose of preventing unfairness.60 First, an at-
torney is not necessarily skilled in detecting subtle
suggestions, he cannot witness deliberately con-
cealed suggestion and he is likely to be considered
as biased a witness as to what occurred as his client.
Second, the lawyer is dearly a less effective witness
than is a videotape. Finally, the lawyer cannot
properly view his role as one of ensuring a fair line-
up. It is the lawyer's duty to see that the line-up
is as unfair in favor of his client as he can make it.
Moreover, the lawyer may feel obliged to convert
the line-up into a discovery procedure.
It can be seen, then, that the lawyer is being
asked to assume a role in lineup cases unsuited to
his qualifications and his essential role in the crimi-
nal process. This is particularly apparent in cases
which follow the model envisioned in the line-up
cases. If a lawyer attends a line-up, assures its
fairness and witnesses the identification, he be-
comes a liability to his client. He cannot challenge
the line-up even if his client demands that he do so,
and, if he files a motion to suppress, he may be
called by the prosecution as its witness.6 The
"7 See United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 898-
900 (2d Cir. 1969).
58See Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520,
523-24 (9th Cir. 1969).
9See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).60 See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional
Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance, 17 UCLAL. REV.
339 (1969). Read's study of the opinions and their
practical effect in the District of Columbia is par-
ticularly excellent. It is to be noted that Professor
Read arrived at his criticism of the use of counsel
despite his essential agreement with the decision of the
Court to extend constitutional review to lineup pro-
cedures. Id. at 363.
61 What the lawyer sees at the lineup is not privi-
leged. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2292 (McNaugh-
ten Rev. ed. 1961).
lawyer may even be called at trial in those jurisdic-
tions where witnesses to a pre-trial identification
may testify about that confrontation.A
The lineup cases represent the apex of the
Court's unconsidered effort to solve difficult situa-
tions by throwing counsel into the breach and
asking counsel to find the answer. The right to
counsel is vital but counsel is not a panacea. Both
the Court and the system it oversees would be
better served by a careful analysis of the real value
of counsel and of the real limits on that value.6'
Procedure
The Court's work in the field of procedure was
not particularly adventuresome. In Fontaine v.
United States," the Court in a per curiam opinion
seemed to hedge somewhat on its commitment to
the proposition that a properly admonished de-
fendant will not, except in the rarest cases, be able
to secure a hearing on a claim that the plea was
coerced. The value of the per curiam opinion may
be of limited use as precedent since it is difficult to
assess whether Fmtaine signals a real shift in attiT
tude or merely a disposition compelled by the
particulars of the record.
The Court did not retreat from its commitment
to the rule that a voluntary plea of guilty entered
with the advice of counsel serves to waive any
claim of violation of rights occurring prior to the
plea. In Tollelt v. Henderson,'- the Court held that
a plea waives a claim of discriminatory grand jury
selection. This rule applies even if the attorney did
not specifically advise his client of the potential
claim unless the defendant shows that the failure
to advise him renders counsel incompetent. The
Court observed that it would be difficult to fault a
Tennessee lawyer for failing to perceive the claim
in 1948, and the Court further noted that counsel
has no obligation to advise a pleading defendant of
every conceivable contention that could be made.
12People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 856
(1960); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 201 A.2d 138
(1965); People v. Dozier, 22 Mich. Appl. 528, 177
N.W. 2d. 694 (1970); State v. Funicello, 49 N.J.
553, 231 A.2d 579, 596-97 (1967), cert. den., 390 U.S.
911 (1968).6 'It may be that Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S. Ct. 1756
(1973), reflects the beginning of a more analytic and
less blind faith approach to counsel questions. There
the Court held that administrative revocation of
probation did not require, in all cases, that counsel
be offered. The Court approved a doctrine which is
founded on the assumption that counsel need be ap-
pointed only when counsel serves some real need.
64 93 S. Ct. 1461 (1973).
65411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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Waiver rules generally have been sustained in the
last few terms and the pattern continued in Davis
v. United States,66 where the failure to raise a claim
of discriminatory grand jury selection prior to trial
was held to preclude the claim either in the subse-
quent criminal proceeding or in post-conviction
review.
In summary, the Court sustained the waiver pro-
vision of rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The Court ruled on two classical pleas to bar
prosecution. In Strunk v. United States,67 a unani-
mous Court reached the unsurprising view that the
only possible remedy for denial of a speedy trial is
dismissal of the charge. The Court did indicate
considerable impatience with the government's
refusal to dispute the basic issue of whether trial
was speedy. In Illinois v. Sommerville," the Court
rejected a claim of double jeopardy. The facts of the
case are complex and not worth discussion here. 9
The significance of Sommervile is its rejection of the
principle that any mistrial not requested or caused
by the accused is prohibited unless it is declared
solely for the benefit of the accused. In this respect
Sommenrille clarified (or overruled, if you prefer)
the apparent stringency of United States v. Jam"Y
The validity of rules requiring discovery of the
defense's case came before the Court in Wardius v.
Oregon. Wardius had failed to comply with a state
alibi notice statute and was precluded from pre-
senting his defense at trial. The Court was, there-
fore, presented with the propriety of exclusion as a
remedy for failure to comply with discovery orders.
The question is quite important since, in criminal
cases, the absolute prohibition of exclusion would
render many discovery rules unenforceable. De-
spite its importance the question remains unre-
solved. Instead, the Court chose to decide that
66 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
6792 S. Ct. 2260 (1973).
- 410 U.S. 458 (1973). The issue in Sommerville
was similar to that first thought to be presented by
Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127 (1972). In addition
to Sommerville the Court decided four other jeopardy
or estoppel cases: Robinson v. Neil, 93 S. Ct. 876
(1973) (doctrine barring retrial on state charges after
trial on municipal charges arising from the same con-
duct is retroactive.); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 93 S. Ct.
1977 (1973); (doctrine barring higher sentence on re-
trial is inapplicable to jury sentencing); Michigan v.
Payne, 93 S. Ct. 1966 (1973) (ban on higher sentence
retrial is not retroactive); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972)
(acquittal of crime does not stop forfeiture).
69 For a discussion of the case see text at 445 infra.
70 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
7193 S. Ct. 2208 (1973).
discovery cannot be had against the defense unless
the law provides the defendant with a similar op-
portunity for discovery. The Court held that it was
"unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details
of his own case while... subjecting him to the
hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the...
evidence.., he disclosed." 7Y et, other language in
the opinion which emphasizes the existence of
reciprocal discovery rights casts doubt on the
precise nature of the holding. Whether the Court
was specifically requiring that the State give dis-
covery of its rebuttal evidence or whether it would
be sufficient if the State simply gave general dis-
covery rights to the defendant is debatable. It is
apparent that a state which gives little or no initial
discovery to the defense could, under Wardius,
require discovery of the defense merely by provid-
ing a limited right of the defense to discovery of
the prosecution's rebuttal evidence. Wardius does
bring into the camp of those who support discovery
of defenses all members of the Court save Justice
Douglas.
In an opinion early in the term, the Court con-
sidered one aspect of trial seldom the subject of its
review: the constitutionally mandated scope of
jury voir dire. The holding in Ham v. South Caro-
lina," is scarcely earthshaking. The Court unani-
mously held that the trial judge was constitu-
tionally obliged to interrogate jurors on the
question of racial bias in a case where the accused
was a bearded, black, civil rights activist who
claimed that a police conspiracy lay behind the
marijuana charge on which he was tried. Over two
dissents, the Court also held that the voir dire need
not include questions about bias toward beards.
The refusal of questions about beards did not
present a constitutional claim.
Ham is a nicely turned opinion. The Court did
open the voir dire to constitutional scrutiny not
often before encountered, but in its disposition of
the beard issue it clarified its intent not to elevate
any but the most fundamental claims of voir dire
error to the status of possible constitutional viola-
tions. This inclusion of dear indications of the
limits of the doctrine is a sound exercise of judicial
discretion. In the past, failure to do this has caused
the Court much grief.74
The Court in Barnes v. United States," approved
7Id. at 2213.
93 S. Ct. 848 (1973).
7 Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) with
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
7 193 S. Ct. 2357 (1973).
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jury instructions that possession of recently stolen
property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordi-
narily a circumstance from which one may reason-
ably infer, in light of the facts of the case, that the
personi in possession of the property knew it was
stolen'. A troubling aspect of this decision is the
recognition that constitutional standards by which
inferences are judged are not dear. Yet, the Court
refused to clarify them. Instead, the Court noted
the use of three standards: "rational connection,"
"more -likely than not" and "reasonable doubt."
The Court did not settle the issue because it found
that. the inference in the case met a reasonable
doubt standard and, a fortiori, all other standards
as well.
The Court, in two cases, took further steps along
the route opened by its 1970 ruling in Procunier v.
Atchley 6. It gave clear evidence of its intent that
state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus use
all state remedies first. Then, when such remedies
have been invoked, great deference must be paid to
the state court resolution of the claims. In Murch v.
Mottram 7 the Court upheld the permanent fore-
closure of federal relief to a state prisoner who,
knowing that he was obliged to raise all claims in a
single state collateral proceeding or waive them,
failed to challenge his conviction in state court.
The Court held that petitioner's testimony that he
did not intend to waive his claims is not sufficient
to preclude a finding of deliberate bypass. In
LaVallee v. Delle RoseT7 the Court, by five to four,
reversed a district judge, reluctantly affirmed by
the court of appeals, who refused to accept a state
court ruling because it did not contain specific
findings of fact. The state court had recited the
evidence and simply concluded that the confessions
were "voluntary." The Court held that "although
... the -state trial court did not specifically articu-
late its credibility findings, it can scarcely be
doubted from its written opinion that respondent's
factual contentions were resolved against him." 79
The Court reiterated that, in these circumstances,
the prisoner must show by convincing evidence
that the state court determination was erroneous.80
76 400 U.S. 446 (1970).
- 409 U.S. 41 (1972).
410 U.S. 690 (1973).
79 Id. at 692.
80 Thi 1972 term was rich in habeas law. Apart from
Murch and LaValle, there was the concern over the
availability of habeas corpus for search and seizure
claims. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 411 U.S. 218
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court also de-
cided Braden v. 30th judicial Circuit Court, 93 S. Ct.
1123 (1973) (jurisdiction over habeas petition by pris-
Lastly, the Court decided three cases requiring
perceptive judgment about particular criminal
trials. In Webb v. Texas,& the facts were these: the
trial judge had warned a defense witness of his
right to refuse to testify and of the possible adverse
use of anything he might say on the stand. The
judge implied that he expected lies from the wit-
ness, who was serving one sentence. Consequently,
he wanted to inform him of the adverse conse-
quences which could flow from such perjury. The
Court in a per curiam opinion held that the remarks
effectively drove the only defense witness off the
stand and denied due process to the accused. The
ruling surely has little value as precedent but it
demonstrates an appropriate sensitivity to the
practical effect of such judical conduct in mid-trial.
In addition, the summary disposition is reflective
of the judgment that nice arguments, carefully
construing the judge's remarks, were simply not a
realistic way to cope with the question presented.
In Cool v. Uniten Stales,2 the Court reversed a
conviction because the jury was instructed in re-
gard to the testimony of an accomplice defense
witness that it could credit it "if the testimony
carries conviction and you are convinced it is true
beyond a reasonable doubt." 1 The dissenters
argued with considerable merit that picking an
isolated passage out of a very long instruction is
not a sensible way to assess tril error. "The
Court's reversal on the ground that one of the
instructions contained a 'negative pregnant'
smacks more of scholastic jurisprudence ... than
it does of... common sense."84 I tend to agree
with the dissent. It is quite hard to square the
Court's approach in Cool with its approach in
Webb, both decided on December 4, 1972. If a dry
scholastic reading of the Cool instructions is justi-
fied, why not a dry, scholastic reading of the
judge's comments in Webb? If the Court was un-
willing to listen to clever arguments about grammar
in Webb, it should not have based its ruling in Cool
upon a grammarian's analysis unrelated to any
oner in one state seeking speedy trial in another state
is available in the state where the trial is sought);
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 93 S. Ct. 1571 (1973)
(state court "recognizance" is sufficient custody to
justify habeas corpus jurisdiction); Preiser v. Rod-
riguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973) (claims of improper
deprivation of "good time" credit must be raised in
habeas corpus and may not be litigated under the
Civil Rights-Acts).
81409 U.S. 95 (1972).
409 U.S. 100 (1972).
E3Id. at 102.
14 Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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consideration of the error in its trial context. Still
another problem is how to square the approach of
the dissenters who, with the exception of the Chief
Justice who dissented only in Cool, are the same in
both cases!
The third case, Chambors v. Mississippi,85 in-
volved the most compelling set of facts the Court
encountered in this term. Chambers was prosecuted
for murder. However, a man named McDonald
had confessed the murder to several close acquaint-
ances of his and, in writing, to Chambers' attor-
neys. Nonetheless, before Chambers came to trial,
McDonald repudiated his confessions. At trial, the
defense called McDonald who admitted but re-
pudiated the written confession. The defense was
denied the right to cross-examine McDonald about
the other confessions since he was a defense witness.
The testimony of witnesses to the other confessions
was ruled inadmissible hearsay.
The resolution of the issues was accomplished
without dissent on the merits though Justice
Rehnquist suggested that the ruling on the merits
could not be sustained as constitutionally re-
quired.8 First, the Court criticized the denial of
cross-examination, asserting that the ancient rule
by which a party vouches for the witnesses he calls
has no validity in the context of present day crimi-
nal cases. Second, the Court found the denial of
cross-examination was crucial because the repudia-
tion of the written confession would be weakened
by exploration of the facts surrounding the oral
confession to others. Third, the Court rejected as
narrow, unrealistic and technical the argument that
McDonald was not an adverse witness because he
did not accuse Chambers of the crime. Finally, the
Court held the denial of cross-examination may not
have been sufficient to occasion reversal, but, when
combined with the exclusion of witnesses to prior
oral confessions; the effect was a deprivation of the
right to present a defense. Moreover, the hearsay
ruling at trial had been erroneous. The reasons the
Court gave were: the confessions were made spon-
taneously, they were corroborated and they con-
stituted admissions against penal interest. Most
important, M%'cDonald was present in court, under
oath, and could be cross-examined by the state con-
cerning his prior confessions, and the jury could
judge directly his credibility.
The Court's disposition of Chambers demon-
strates close analysis of the facts and of the appli-
cable legal rules and is a considered and appro-
86 410 U.S. 284 (1973).81 d. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
priately limited resolution of the issues. The case
is unusual and the Court treaded unfamiliar
ground. Any court could sense the legitimacy of
Chambers' demand for evidence, but to satisfy
that demand could require the destruction of
several traditional and, ordinarily, sound rules of
law. If the concern for the continuity of legal rules
prevails, the accused endures a patently disturbing
kind of trial. If the established rules are hastily
wrenched away, the resulting decision may be a
legal cannon used for pounding at both sound
structures and rotting timbers. In Chambers the
Court avoided both extremes by conforming its
rules closely to the facts of the case. Accordingly,
there is in the case the sine qua non for the admis-
sion of oral confessions: the maker must be present
in court and available for cross-examination. This
prevents contrived evidence that some unavailable
person confessed to the crime with which the ac-
cused is charged. So too, there is the necessary
emphasis on spontaneity and corroboration of the
confessions. The opinion in Chambers performs
precisely the task set before the Court.-
Cool, Webb and Chambers are not great cases. No
abiding or particularly novel principles are es-
tablished. The rulings are limited, tied closely to
the facts of the particular case. When the Court
decides cases of this sort, it is criticized because it
spends its time and effort serving as little more than
an ordinary court of errors and appeals. The
criticism has validity, but it is of value to see how
the Court deals with ordinary cases. It allows com-
parison with the job done by other courts. There is
a scale to measure some judicial weaknesses and
strengths. So much of the Court's work is unique
that its members usually claim that- no prior
judicial experience really prepares one to fill the
role demanded of a Justice. Nevertheless, some
assessment must be made of Justices in the same
way that judges are assessed. Though a fine judge
may become an inept Justice, I doubt that a
mediocre judge can achieve greatness as L Justice.
The ability of a Justice to be a good judge is an
indication of necessary (though not sufficient)
qualifications. For this reason alone, Cool, Webb,
Chambers, and Neil v. Biggers as well, are worthy
of close study.
Conclusion
Nothing changed very much this term. The
prosecution won more cases than it used to, but
this is simply the continuation of an established
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mode. The Court maintained its recently acquired
practice of hearing many cases in which the prose-
cution is seeking review More importantly, the
Court has not abandoned the broad role it now
plays in the development of criminal justice. If the
slow, measured pace of this last term means any-
thing at all, it means the Court will not alter the
doctrines of the 1960's with the degree of haste that
attended their original adoption. Only the abortion
decision resembles the sort of judicial bombshell
that fell throughout the 1960's. But the Supreme
Court remains the most important criminal law
court in the land. There is little dissent to the
continuing pattern of vigorous review and of tight
constitutional control over state and federal crimi-
nal procedure. If the opinions in this term show
change, the change is exceedingly subtle. Perhaps
Chambers v. Mississippi is a sign of things to come.
As in recent years, the Court subjected two tradi-
tional state law rules, with no apparent constitu-
tional significance, to a searching constitutional
analysis. No one disputes that Chambers represents
a "further constitutionalization of the intricacies of
the common law of evidence." 89 The result in
Chambers resembles the result the Court would
have reached six years ago. But in reaching its end,
the Court followed a very different star. The Court
found constitutional error because an accused was
prevented from offering highly probative evidence
in his defense-part of the relevant truth was kept
from the jury. There was no reliance on absolutes
or abstract principles. The decision was not
founded on value judgments about which party to
the criminal case ought to have a handicap. The
criterion was solely whether, after careful analysis,
it could be said that the state rules served the
interests of truth. Often, in recent years, the debate
has centered on the abstract issue of whether or
not the Constitution "was designed to make the
job of the prosecutor difficult." 90 In Chambers,
the Court simply ignored such questions. Chambers
7See Table 1.
See Table 2.
410 U.S. at 308.
Barnes v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2366 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
may signal a new emphasis on the pursuit of truth
as the fundamental concern of a constitutional
system of criminal justice. If this is so, then we are




Term For Against TotalTem Government Government a
1968 17 38 55
1969 16b 26b 42b
1970 29 14 43
1971 28 37 65
1972 36 26 62
a The table was compiled by first checking the final
index in the appropriate volume of the BNA CmMINAL
LAW REPORTER for all cases decided by the Supreme
Court that Term. Next, U.S. REPoRTs were checked
to find all opinions that went to the merits of the case.
This turned up some per curiam opinions which are
included in the totals. For the 1972 Term, the advance
sheets for volumes 409,410 and part one of volume 411,
of U.S. REPoRTs; volumes 12 and 13 of the BNA
CRImiNAL LAW REPORTER; and 93 S. Ct. have been
used.
b In one case, each side won one issue.
TABLE 2a






Table includes federal and state habeas corpus
decisions, and military cases.
b 11 per curiam opinions which reached the merits
are included.
c 2 per curiam.
d 2 per curiam.
03 per curiam.
1 8 per curiam.
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